Things to read when life gets too boring

Thu, 18 Oct 2001 15:13:58 EDT

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I attended a Roundtable discussion at a State of the World Forum in San=20
Francisco a few years ago.  Richard Butler, author of this opinion, was=20
moderator of the discussion.  I sat next to Sen. Alan Cranston on one side=20
and Bianca Jagger on the other.  It was a very interesting discussion. =20
Butler had to leave in the middle of the discussion due to an emergency with=
=20
the inspections process with Iraq.  Here is what he has to say about=20
biological weapons.

Love, and still quivering in my boots in Folsom (but damn tired of it),
Carol

Who Made the Anthrax?
Commentary by Richard Butler for <A HREF=3D"http://www.nytimes.com/partners/=
aol/homepage/index.html">The New York Times</A>
=20
Let's call it what it is: Sending mail laced with anthrax is an act of=20
terrorism. Terrorists aim to cause terror, and in this they have succeeded,=20
up to a point. The run on Cipro at pharmacies demonstrates that. If they als=
o=20
aim to use biological weapons to kill on a large scale, they have not=20
succeeded =E2=80=94 not yet.

To ensure their failure we need to act fast, following a largely scientific=20
path. At the end of that path the politics of responding to this form of=20
terrorism will enter the picture. It will be a dark picture if it is=20
discovered that the anthrax spread in the United States was supplied by a=20
state.

We need first to determine what kind of anthrax was in the mailings. Was it=20
basic material fermented in some basement? Or was it more sophisticated,=20
weapons-grade anthrax, which could only have been made by skilled people in=20
possession of expensive equipment? The findings from the office of Senator=20
Tom Daschle, although they are still quite tentative, may suggest the latter=
.=20
That would be serious.

When we know the answer to this first technical question, we can move to the=
=20
second: Who has the requisite know-how and equipment? This may position us t=
o=20
achieve what is essential =E2=80=94 to find out who is mailing the anthrax a=
nd stop=20
them, and to deal with their source of anthrax if they did not themselves=20
make it.=20

Given the apparent quality of the anthrax mailed to the Senate, the candidat=
e=20
list for an answer to the second question is small. High-quality anthrax was=
=20
made by the United States, Russia, Britain and a few other cold war=20
participants. The consequence of this is that there is a pool of scientists=20
out there who have the know-how.

Their continuing access to the equipment used to make weapons-grade anthrax,=
=20
however, is a matter of much less certainty. All those countries signed the=20
Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, pledging to get out of the biological=
=20
weapons business and destroy their existing stocks. It seems that all of the=
m=20
acted accordingly =E2=80=94 except Russia, which continued a sizable clandes=
tine=20
biological weapons program, including work on anthrax, until 1990.

Iraq also signed the 1972 convention. But at President Saddam Hussein's=20
direction, Iraq embarked on a substantial biological weapons program, in=20
which anthrax production had the leading role.

As the leader from 1997 to 1999 of the United Nations effort to remove Mr.=20
Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, I found one rule of thumb to have=20
merit: The vigor with which Iraq conspired to defeat any given step toward=20
arms control was a good indicator of how interested Mr. Hussein was in the=20
weapons system at issue. I concluded that biological weapons are closest to=20
President Hussein's heart because it was in this area that his resistance to=
=20
our work reached its height. He seemed to think killing with germs has a lot=
=20
to recommend it.

Iraq had problems in refining its crude anthrax to the more potent,=20
longer-living form of dry, small particles. Saddam Hussein's regime spent=20
millions of dollars on the necessary equipment. Because of his resistance to=
=20
our arms control program, we never knew precisely what he had achieved. But=20
we know he loaded anthrax into shells, bombs and missile warheads.

Iraq has not been visited by international weapons inspectors for the past=20
three years. It is impossible to know what further steps Mr. Hussein has=20
taken, but all the signs are that he has remained in the bioweapons business=
.

If the scientific path leads to Iraq as the supporter of the anthrax used by=
=20
the terrorist mailers in the United States, no one should be surprised.=20
Meetings between Mohamed Atta, who is thought to have been an organizer of=20
the Sept. 11 attacks, and an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague in June=20
2000 may have been an occasion on which anthrax was provided to Mr. Atta.=20
There have also been reports of meetings between senior Iraqi intelligence=20
officials and members of Al Qaeda.

The possibility of a Russian origin for the anthrax also needs to be=20
investigated because of the scale of Russia's past program and the collapse=20
of large portions of its weapons laboratories. It is not clear what has=20
happened to the biological materials it made. Criminal groups have attempted=
=20
to sell Russian nuclear materials. Could the same be true of biological=20
materials and bioweapons know-how?

We need the facts. The politics will then follow.

Richard Butler is ambassador in residence at the Council on Foreign Relation=
s=20
and author of the forthcoming "Fatal Choice: Nuclear Weapons and the Illusio=
n=20
of Missile Defense."=20

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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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<HTML>I attended a Roundtable discu=
ssion at a State of the World Forum in San Francisco a few years ago. &nbsp;=
Richard Butler, author of this opinion, was moderator of the discussion. &nb=
sp;I sat next to Sen. Alan Cranston on one side and Bianca Jagger on the oth=
er. &nbsp;It was a very interesting discussion. &nbsp;Butler had to leave in=
 the middle of the discussion due to an emergency with the inspections proce=
ss with Iraq. &nbsp;Here is what he has to say about biological weapons.
 
 Love, and still quivering in my boots in Folsom (but damn tired of it),
 Carol
 
 Who Made the Anthrax?
 Commentary by Richard Butler for <A HREF=3D"http://www.nytim=
es.com/partners/aol/homepage/index.html">The New York Times</A><FONT=20=
 COLOR=3D"#000000" SIZE=3D2 FAMILY=3D"SANSSERIF" FACE=3D"Arial" LANG=3D"0">
 =20
 Let's call it what it is: Sending mail laced with anthrax is an act of t=
errorism. Terrorists aim to cause terror, and in this they have succeeded, u=
p to a point. The run on Cipro at pharmacies demonstrates that. If they also=
 aim to use biological weapons to kill on a large scale, they have not succe=
eded =E2=80=94 not yet.
 
 To ensure their failure we need to act fast, following a largely scienti=
fic path. At the end of that path the politics of responding to this form of=
 terrorism will enter the picture. It will be a dark picture if it is discov=
ered that the anthrax spread in the United States was supplied by a state.
 
 We need first to determine what kind of anthrax was in the mailings. Was=
 it basic material fermented in some basement? Or was it more sophisticated,=
 weapons-grade anthrax, which could only have been made by skilled people in=
 possession of expensive equipment? The findings from the office of Senator=20=
Tom Daschle, although they are still quite tentative, may suggest the latter=
. That would be serious.
 
 When we know the answer to this first technical question, we can move to=
 the second: Who has the requisite know-how and equipment? This may position=
 us to achieve what is essential =E2=80=94 to find out who is mailing the an=
thrax and stop them, and to deal with their source of anthrax if they did no=
t themselves make it.=20
 
 Given the apparent quality of the anthrax mailed to the Senate, the cand=
idate list for an answer to the second question is small. High-quality anthr=
ax was made by the United States, Russia, Britain and a few other cold war p=
articipants. The consequence of this is that there is a pool of scientists o=
ut there who have the know-how.
 
 Their continuing access to the equipment used to make weapons-grade anth=
rax, however, is a matter of much less certainty. All those countries signed=
 the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, pledging to get out of the biolo=
gical weapons business and destroy their existing stocks. It seems that all=20=
of them acted accordingly =E2=80=94 except Russia, which continued a sizable=
 clandestine biological weapons program, including work on anthrax, until 19=
90.
 
 Iraq also signed the 1972 convention. But at President Saddam Hussein's=20=
direction, Iraq embarked on a substantial biological weapons program, in whi=
ch anthrax production had the leading role.
 
 As the leader from 1997 to 1999 of the United Nations effort to remove M=
r. Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, I found one rule of thumb to have=20=
merit: The vigor with which Iraq conspired to defeat any given step toward a=
rms control was a good indicator of how interested Mr. Hussein was in the we=
apons system at issue. I concluded that biological weapons are closest to Pr=
esident Hussein's heart because it was in this area that his resistance to o=
ur work reached its height. He seemed to think killing with germs has a lot=20=
to recommend it.
 
 Iraq had problems in refining its crude anthrax to the more potent, long=
er-living form of dry, small particles. Saddam Hussein's regime spent millio=
ns of dollars on the necessary equipment. Because of his resistance to our a=
rms control program, we never knew precisely what he had achieved. But we kn=
ow he loaded anthrax into shells, bombs and missile warheads.
 
 Iraq has not been visited by international weapons inspectors for the pa=
st three years. It is impossible to know what further steps Mr. Hussein has=20=
taken, but all the signs are that he has remained in the bioweapons business=
.
 
 If the scientific path leads to Iraq as the supporter of the anthrax use=
d by the terrorist mailers in the United States, no one should be surprised.=
 Meetings between Mohamed Atta, who is thought to have been an organizer of=20=
the Sept. 11 attacks, and an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague in June 2=
000 may have been an occasion on which anthrax was provided to Mr. Atta. The=
re have also been reports of meetings between senior Iraqi intelligence offi=
cials and members of Al Qaeda.
 
 The possibility of a Russian origin for the anthrax also needs to be inv=
estigated because of the scale of Russia's past program and the collapse of=20=
large portions of its weapons laboratories. It is not clear what has happene=
d to the biological materials it made. Criminal groups have attempted to sel=
l Russian nuclear materials. Could the same be true of biological materials=20=
and bioweapons know-how?
 
 We need the facts. The politics will then follow.
 
 
 Richard Butler is ambassador in residence at the Council on Foreign R=
elations and author of the forthcoming "Fatal Choice: Nuclear Weapons and th=
e Illusion of Missile Defense."=20
 </HTML>

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